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Planned Parenthood v. Clark County School
District: "Having Your Cake and Eating It
Too" in Public School Free Speech Cases
Freedom of expression is one of the more cherished rights
protected by the Constitution. The right itself is simply stated:
"Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press . . . ."' Although significant free speech
cases did not surface until after World War I, the Supreme
Court has been confronted with a steady stream of these cases
in the decades that have followed. As would be expected, the
numerous Supreme Court cases have resulted in a wide variety
of scholarly analysis and commentary2
In relatively recent years, free speech in the context of
public schools has become a hotly litigated issue. When
analyzing free speech rights "in light of the special
characteristics of the school en~ironrnent,"~
the Supreme Court
grants school officials a degree of control over the First
Amendment rights of students, teachers, and other persons
within that environment. The discretion school officials have to
infringe on freedom of expression rights within the school
1. U.S.CONST.amend. I.
2. The literature on the First Amendment is enormous. For a small
sampling of useful literature on the history and scope of freedom of expression
rights, see C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978); Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political
Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN.L. REV.
299 (1978); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost
Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984); David M.
Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U . CM. L. REV.
1205 (1983); Martin H.Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U . PA. L. REV. 591
(1982); Mark C. Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment
Protection, 9 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1974); William Van Alstyne, A Graphic
Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107 (1982); Harry H.
Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105 (1979); Fred C.
Zacharias, Flowcharting the First Amendment, 72 CORNELLL. REV. 936 (1987).
3. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969).
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environment, as interpreted in Planned Parenthood v. Clark
County School ~ i s t r i c t ;is the subject of this note. In Planned
Parenthood, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted school
officials rather expansive authority to control freedom of
expression in school publications, a decision some claim is
based on "a fundamental misunderstanding" of Supreme Court
pre~edent.~
Part I1 of this note examines the background of free speech
within the public school environment and the current judicial
standards governing its control. Part I11 discusses the facts and
analysis of the Planned Parenthood decision. Part IV focuses on
the scope of the authority given school officials to control free
speech in Planned Parenthood and compares this decision with
related Supreme Court precedents. This note concludes that
the majority opinion in Planned Parenthood severely curtails
First Amendment rights.

A. The Tinker Standard
The first signXicant Supreme Court decision discussing the
issue of freedom of expression in public schools was Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School D i s t r i d In Tinker, a school district's principals passed a regulation that prohibited students from wearing black armbands on school campuses.' Three students wore armbands to protest the Vietnam
war and were suspended until they agreed to comply with the
regulation? The students sued the school district and sought
an injunction against enforcement of the regulation, claiming
that their First Amendment right to freedom of expression had
been violated.
The Court began its discussion with the oft-quoted statement, "[Ilt can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate." However, the Court also

4. 941 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1991).
5. E-g., id. at 831 (Norris, J., dissenting).
6. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
7. Id. at 504.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 506. For cases discussing constitutional rights in the public school
context, see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
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recognized the "need for firming the comprehensive authority
of the States and of school officials . . . to prescribe and control
conduct in the school^."'^ Balancing these potentially conflicting principles, the Court determined that students could be
"trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of
ideas which discovers truth,"" but that school officials could
retain discretion t o maintain order and to prohibit distractions
when students are at school.
In reaching this balance, the Supreme Court adopted the
following standard: a student "may express his opinions, even
on controversial subjects . . . if he does so without 'materially
and substantially interferring] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and without
colliding with the rights of others."12 If the student's conduct
"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder
or invasion of the rights of others," such conduct is not protected as constitutional free speech.13
The language of the Court's opinion strongly suggests that
this standard would be applied strictly in favor of free speech.
Prohibiting expression would only be allowed in "carefully restricted circumstances."14State-supported schools are "not [to]
be enclaves of totalitarianism" where students are "regarded as
closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to
c~mmunicate."'~
Although recognizing a legitimate state pow268 US. 510 (1925).
10. Tinker, 393 U.S.at 507.
11. Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)).
12. Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
13. Id. The reason the school officials in Tinlzer passed the regulation, and
one of their major arguments before the Court, was that they feared the wearing
of armbands could potentially cause disorder or disturbances within the school. The
Supreme Court, however, found this argument unpersuasive and not within the
standard allowing for speech restrictions. The Court reasoned as follows:
[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure
from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the
majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken . . that deviates
from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a
disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this risk; and our
history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom-this kind of openness-that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence
and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.
Id. at 508-09 (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 513.
15. Id. a t 511; see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US. 390, 402 (1923) (reject-

.
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er to curtail First Amendment rights because of the unique
environment of public schools, this dictum in Tinker indicates
that the Court strongly favors freedom of expression over
discipline.

B. Forum Analysis:
Placing the Tinker Standard in Context
In subsequent decisions, the Court developed a forum analysis to determine when and how the Tinker standard should be
applied? Under this analysis, two categorical forums, open
and closed, were developed. The open category can be divided
into traditional public forums and limited public forums created by government designation. Traditional public forums are
"places which by long tradition or by government fiat have
been devoted to assembly and debate," such as streets and
parks.'? Designated public forums are public places which,
although normally considered closed forums, have been opened
by the state "for use by the public as a place for expressive
activity."18 When the state creates a designated public forum,
it cannot later "enforce certain exclusions" within that forum,
even "if it was not required to create the forum in the first

ing the principle that a state may use any means to "foster a homogeneous people").
16. Why the Court decided that it needed a context or forum analysis to apply the Tinker standard is never fully explained. Indeed, the Tinker standard was
specifically adapted to be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the
forum
school environment." Tinker, 393 U.S. a t 506. I t appears that a specific
l e maybe the obvialready existed; why impose a n additional analysis? ~ ~ o s s i b (or
ous) rationale is that, as the Court gradually moved away from strict protection of
First Amendment rights, the Tinker standard was seen as unduly restrictive.
Therefore, to dilute Tinker's protections for freedom of expression in the
schools, barriers were erected to narrow its application. Rather than applying the
Tinker standard in all public school free speech cases, as the Supreme Court apparently originally intended, courts must now wait until the plaintiff can successfully jump through additional hoops before Tinker controls the analysis. As explained in this note, these barriers or additional hoops significantly curtail Tinker's
importance and impede First Amendment rights on the school grounds.
17. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
In Perry, the Perry Education Association (PEA) was allowed access to the interschool mail system and to the teachers' mailboxes in the Perry Township schools
under a collective bargaining agreement. Rival unions, including Perry Local
Educators' Association (PLEA), were not allowed this privilege. PLEA claimed that
PEA'S preferential treatment infringed on their First Amendment and equal protection rights and brought suit. In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld the agreement.
18. Id.

,
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place."19 However, the state may create a designated public
forum "for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups, or
for the discussion of certain subject^."'^ Such a forum can be
created by the government's stated policy or its practices."
Once a designated public forum is created, it is treated like an
open public forum, limited only by the purpose for which the
forum was ~reated.~'
When the Court determines that it is dealing with a traditional or designated public forum, it applies strict scrutiny
when reviewing any exclusions from the forum. "For the State
to enforce a content-based exclusion" strict scrutiny requires
the state to "show that its regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end."23
The second category includes "[plublic property which is
not by tradition or designation a forum for public communicat i ~ n . "These
~ ~ closed forums are "governed by different standard~."'~
Rather than applying strict scrutiny, the Court only
strikes down governmental regulation of such forums if the
regulation i s unreasonable. The s t a t e may enforce
content-based regulations "as long as the regulation on speech
is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker's view."26

19. Id.
20. Id. a t 46 n.7 (citations omitted).
21. See infra text accompanying note 43.
22. The Court later defined limited or designated public forums with more
precision:
"[Llimited public forums[]" consist[] primarily of government property
which the government has opened for use as a place for expressive activity for a limited amount of time, or for a limited class of speakers, or
for a limited number of topics. In a limited public forum, it is not history
or tradition, but the government's own acquiescence in the use of the
property as a forum for expressive activity that tells us that such activity
is compatible with the uses to which the place is normally put.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 817 (1985) (citations omitted).
23. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
The Court limited the compelling state interest test to content-based exclusions
allowing states to enforce "[r]easonable time, place, and manner regulations." Id. a t
46 (emphasis added). For time, place, and manner restrictions, the much lower reasonableness standard is now applied.
24. Id. at 46.
25. Id.
26. Id.; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. a t 806 ("Control over access to a
nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as
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Because public schools fall within the second or closed
category:? school officials have more discretion to restrict free
speech, thus limiting Tinker's dictum that celebrates freedom of
As long as school officials have not created a desexpres~ion.~~
ignated or limited public forum, their regulations and actions
will be reviewed under the reasonableness standard rather
than under strict scrutiny.2sWhen deciding whether a designated or limited public forum has been created," the Court
looks t o the policy or practice of the school to determine whether the officials "opened [the forum] for indiscriminate use by
the general p~blic."~'However, if the forum has not been
opened, the regulations or policies will be upheld as long as
they seem reasonably designed to pass the Tinker test.

C. The Cornelius Test and the Further Weakening
of Tinker in Hazelwood

As the Court became more conservative through the Burger and Rehnguist years, it moved away from Tinker's strong
support of free speech and allowed states more authority and

the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum
and are viewpoint neutral.").
27. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1987) ("The
public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets, parks, and other traditional public forums that 'time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.' "
(citations omitted)).
28. Even more disturbing is the degree t o which the forum analysis weakens
the freedom of expression protections Tinker firmly provided for those in public
schools. As the Court moves away from strongly protecting First Amendment
rights, the forum analysis now allows it to give school officials broad discretion in
regulating speech, just as long as the regulations are reasonable. This is an enormous retreat from Tinker, which only allowed regulation in "carefully restricted circumstances." Tinlzer, 393 U.S. at 513. See supra note 16.
29. "The reasonableness of the Government's restriction of access to a
non-public forum must be assessed in the light of the purpose of the forum and all
the surrounding circumstances." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809. This language seems to
give the Court more discretion in finding that the actions and policies of the state
or school district are reasonable. By drawing on all the surrounding circumstances
and the purposes for which a restriction was employed, the Court could find that
almost any restriction was reasonable.
30. It is not always easy to determine the type of forum with which the
Court is dealing. "The line between limited public forums and nonpublic forums
'may blur at the edges,' and is really more in the nature of a continuum than a
definite demarcation." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 819 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 US. 114,
132 (1981)) (citations omitted).
31. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983).
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discretion to limit freedom of expression within the school environment. This movement away from Tinker was evidenced by
the Court's decisions in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
Education FundS2 a n d Hazelwood School District v.
KuhlmeierF3
In Cornelius, the Court condensed earlier opinions and
formulated a three-pronged test to be applied in free speech
cases.34 First, the district court must decide whether the
speech involved is protected by the First Amendment; if not,
the court "need go no further."35 Second, the court should apply the forum analysis to "identify the nature of the forum,
because the extent to which the Government may limit access
~~
depends on whether the forum is public or n o n p u b l i ~ . "Third,
after the forum type is ascertained, the court must apply the
requisite standard (reasonableness or strict scrutiny) in assessing the justifications for excluding plaintiff from the forum.37
After Cornelius, the Court's decisions involving free speech
in public schools began to allow more censorship and regulation
and less freedom of expression. In Hazelwood, the Court interpreted Perry Educational Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'nS8 broadly, giving school officials significant discretion.
Staff members of a high school newspaper had claimed their
First Amendment right to free speech was violated when school
officials censored two articles that were to be printed in the
n e ~ s p a p e r . ~School
'
officials felt that they should delete the
articles before the paper was published4' because some of the
32. 473 US. 788 (1985).
33. 484 U.S.260 (1988).
34. Cornelius involved the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC), a charity drive
aimed at federal employees. This fund-raiser is conducted in the federal workplace
during working hours. Federal employees contribute a substantial amount of money
to the charitable participants each year. Plaintiffs were not allowed to participate
in the CFC because they did not meet the criteria established for such participation. They brought suit, claiming their exclusion violated their rights to free speech
and equal protection. Id. at 790-93.
35. Id. at 797.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 460 US. 37 (1983).
39. Hazelwood, 484 US. at 262-64. The deleted material included an "article
describ[ing school] students' experiences with pregnancy" and an "article discuss[ing] the impact of divorce on students at the school." Id. at 263.
40. Because the paper was to be published by the end of the year, the school
oflticials felt that there was not enough time to make the changes necessary to
print the articles. Therefore, the paper was printed without the objectionable articles. The student editors were not informed about the deletion until after the pa-
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material was "inappropriate for some of the younger stud e n t ~ , "and
~ ~ some students and parents could possibly be
identified in some articles discussing sensitive issues.42
In its forum analysis, the Court held that "school facilities
may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities
have 'by policy or by practice' opened those facilities 'for indiscriminate use by the general public,' or by some segment of the
public, such as student organization^.'"^ No forum is created
when "the facilities have instead been reserved for other intended purposes, 'communicative or otherwise,' " and in those
circumstances "school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and other members of
the school community."44
The Court essentially ignored the Tinker standard, developing instead a standard that gives school districts much more
leverage in limiting free speech within schools.45 The new
standard allows school officials to control "the style and content
of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so
long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedaTherefore, as long as a public forum has
gogical
per was published. Id. at 263-64.
41. Id.
42. They felt that some of the anonymous students describing their sexual
activity could be identified in the text. Furthermore, as to the article on divorce,
the school officials felt it was unfair to allow some of the objectionable remarks
made by named students about their parents to be printed without giving the parents an opportunity to respond. Id.
43. Id. at 267 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 47).
44. Id. (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 46). The Court said further that the government does not create a forum by "inaction" or allowing "limited discourse," but
only by "intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse." Id.
(quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985)).
45. In response to the argument based on the Tinker standard that speech
can be regulated only if it "materially and substantially interfedes] with the requirements of appropriate discipline," the Court in Hazelwood stated that the above
language 'does not, of course, even accurately reflect our holding in Tinker. Furthermore, the statement nowhere expressly extended the Tinker standard to the
news and feature articles contained in a school-sponsored newspaper." Hazelwood,
484 U.S. at 269 n.2. Justice B r e ~ a n(joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun)
wrote in his dissenting opinion that the "Court today casts no doubt on Tinker's
vitality. Instead it erects a taxonomy of school censorship, concluding that Tinker
applies to one category and not another." Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 273. The Court also appears to define pedagogical concerns very
broadly. School officials may exercise control over activities which "may fairly be
characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a
traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members
and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and

9831

PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. CLARK COUNTY

991

not been created, and provided that the school's restrictions
reasonably meet this standard, school officials may restrict
freedom of expression. Against this background, Planned Parenthood was decided.

A. The Facts
The Clark County School District authorized its high
schools t o publish newspapers, yearbooks, and athletic programs. These publications were partially funded by revenues
obtained from entities that advertised in the printed materials.
The school district maintained a policy that allowed the individual school principals t o exercise control over the advertising
they accepted and printed.47 This policy stated that the
"school reserves the right to deny advertising space to any
entity that does not serve the best interests of the school, the
school district and the community."48
After accepting a wide variety of advertisements from numerous group^,'^ the school district declined, on several occasions, to accept a Planned Parenthood ad~ertisement.~'This

audiences." Id. at 271.
47. Planned Parenthood v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 820 (9th
Cir. 1991). The policy stated that "[ilf a school publication does accept advertising,
some categories of advertising may be excluded." For example, schools may decline
to accept advertisements for "[dlrugs, paraphernalia, or alcoholic beverage[s] . . .
[which] may be viewed as encouraging action which might endanger the health and
welfare of students." Id. n.1. Furthermore, advertisements may be excluded if they
are "libelous, vulgar, racially offensive, factually inaccurate, or of poor production
quality" or "have explicit sexual content or overtones." Id. The policy also states
that if "advertising is allowed which promotes one side of a controversial issue,
advertisements promoting the opposing side of a controversy should be similarly accepted." Id.
48. Id. at 821.
49. The school district ran ads from "casinos, bars, churches, political candidates and the United States Army." Id. at 830-31 (Norris, J., dissenting).
50. The. proposed advertisement read:
PLANNED PARENTHOOD
OF SOUTHERN NEVADA, INC.
601 South Thirteenth Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Routine Gynecological Exams
Birth Control Methods
Pregnancy Testing & Verification
Pregnancy Counseling & Referral
Id. at 821 n.2.
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was the only advertisement rejected by the school district.51
Planned Parenthood then brought suit, claiming that its free
speech rights had been violated.
Initially, the district court concluded that a limited public
forum had been created and that the advertisements should
have been published. However, the Supreme Court subsequently decided Hazelwood and the district court withdrew its
initial opinion. On reconsideration, the district court, applying
Hazelwood, "found that the publications were nonpublic for m s " and that the school's rejections of the advertisements
were rea~onable.~~
Planned Parenthood appealed, and the
Ninth Circuit en banc aff"11med.~~

B. The Ninth Circuit's Reasoning
In applying the three-pronged Cornelius testF4 the court
quickly bypassed the first prong because both parties agreed
that the advertisements were "protected speech under the first
amendment."55Therefore, the court moved directly to the second prong-the determination whether the publications were
public or non-public forums. In examining the "policy and pract i ~ e "of~ the
~ school district, the court stressed that "the
school's intent was the critical factor in the forum calculus."57
The court determined that the schools had not intended to
create a public forum, but rather to maintain the publications

51. P l a ~ e dParenthood submitted the advertisement to be printed in school
newspapers and athletic programs, but not in yearbooks. One school did publish
the advertisement. Id. at 821.
52. Id. The district court's withdrawal of its decision shows the significance of
Hazelwood. Using earlier precedents (primarily San Diego Comm. Against Registration & the Draft (Card) v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986)), the district court determined that a limited public forum had been created in the advertising space of the publications. Because a public forum was created, the school
district needed to show that a compelling state interest allowed it to exclude the
P l a ~ e dParenthood advertisements. It could not do so.
broadened school rights to censor student
However, Hazelwood si-cantly
speech (as related to the Tinker standard), which apparently impressed the district
court enough to cause it to reverse its decision. As previously mentioned,
Hazelwood involved students and student speech in a classroom. It seems a signscant jump for a district court to apply the same standard, in the face of much
more restrictive precedent, to non-student speech in a non-classroom activity.
53. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 817.
54. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 797; supra text accompanying notes 33-37.
55. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 821.
56. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; supra note 43 and accompanying text.
57. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 823; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
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as closed forums.58Such intent, coupled with the practice of
"retaining control and requiring prior approval," failed to reveal
the "requisite 'clear intent to create a public forum' Hazelwood
requires."59
The bulk of the forum analysis in the court's opinion focused on the policy of the school district, with little discussion
of the district's practice. The court, in passing, simply stated
that the school district's "practices were not inconsistent with
Planned Parenthood claimed that a "limited
these poli~ies."~~
forum" had been created in the advertisement area of the
publications6' because the "schools solicited and accepted an
array of ad~ertising.'~~
The court disregarded this claim and
stated, "we believe these points misdirect the inquiry, which
the Supreme Court has instead focused on the schools' intent."" Therefore, using the intent test discussed in
Hazelwood, the court centered its attention on the intent of the
school district and ignored the district's actual practices.
Having decided that the advertising pages were a nonpublic forum, the court turned to the third prong of the
Cornelius test: "whether the school's justification for refusing to
publish Planned Parenthood's advertisement [was] reasonable."64The court found that the justification was reasonable
for several reasons. First, the schools desired to remain viewpoint neutral on the "sensitive and controversial issue of family
plan~~ing.''~~
Second, the schools felt, that "parents would ob-

58. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 823-24.
59. Id. at 825 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.260, 270
(1988)).
60. Id. at 824.
61. Id. at 825.
62. Id. at 826; see supra note 49.
63. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 826.
64. Id. at 829.
65. Id. The Court added that the school district's related justification to
"avoid being forced to open up their publications for advertisements on both sides
of the 'pro-life'-'pro-choice' debate" was also legitimate. Id. However, as the dissent
points out, there may be problems with the finding of the school district's desire to
remain "viewpoint neutral" on a controversial issue. "[Tlhe school district has made
no showing that Planned Parenthood's ad would have been more controversial than
ads from political candidates, churches, casinos and bars." Id. at 842 (Nods, J.,
dissenting).
Also, it does not seem reasonable to assume that just because the school permitted a rather generic Planned Parenthood ad in its publications, the community
would assume that the school district favors or has adopted Planned Parenthood's
position. Some Supreme Court Justices have acknowledged that they "think that
secondary school students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a
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ject to the ad~ertisement."~~
Third, the court stated that the
reasonableness of the regulation was enhanced when it "consider[ed] the emotional maturity of the intended audience."67
Considering these points, the court held that the prohibition of
the ad was reasonable and upheld the lower court's decision.

IV. ANALYSIS
Teenage pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, drugs,
and other similar problems are reaching epidemic proportions
and are destroying many of America's youth. It is not unreasonable to assume that nonprofit corporations like Planned
Parenth0od,6~which offer "clinical, educational and counseling
service^,"^ will continue attempting to reach teenagers by exercising First Amendment rights through the most effective
medium available: the school system. Indeed, many Americans
believe that granting such organizations this right would produce socially desirable results. However, the majority opinion
in Planned Parenthood does little to advance these rights or
the values underlying the First Amendment. As the dissent
points out, "the majority's opinion reflects a judicial mindset
that, anytime a First Amendment issue can be said to arise out
of the 'school environment,' decisions of school authorities restricting protected expression will receive minimal scrutiny."70
But minimal scrutiny is not adequate when such a cherished
school does not endorse or support . . . speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis." Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., plurality opinion). If the students are Likely to perceive this, is it reasonable to
say that the parents will not? All of this shows the substantial area within which
schools may move when limited only by the "reasonableness" standard.
66. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 829. Again, the dissent has serious
doubts about this reasoning. "At best, then, the record shows that school authorities shied away from an ad for family planning services because they feared it
might be offensive to some people. Such an . . . exclusion based on undifferentiated fears plainly offends constitutional norms." Id. at 842 (Norris, J., dissenting); see
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100-01 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
67. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d a t 829 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.260, 272 (1988)). Considering the growing rate of sexual adivity among high school students these days, this rationale may be unreasonable. I t
could be argued that given the rate of sexual activity among high school students,
i t is reasonable to assume those students are emotionally mature enough to understand and appreciate information promoting responsible sexual behavior.
68. Id. at 820. The Planned Parenthood organization involved in this case is
"affiliated with Planned Parenthood Federation of America." Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 844 (Norris, J., dissenting).

9831

PLANNED PARENTHOOD v. CLARK COUNTY

995

right as freedom of expression is involved.
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Hazelwood runs into
difficulty when compared to other Supreme Court decisions.
For example, in Tinker the Supreme Court considered it significant that the school's policy "did not purport to prohibit the
wearing of all symbols of political or controversial signifi~ a n c e " ;rather,
~~
the school prohibited wearing "a particular
symbol."72 According to the Court, unless a prohibition meets
~
prohibition of expression of one
the Tinker ~ t a n d a r d , ' "the
particular opinion . . . is not constitutionally permi~sible."~~
Similarly, in Planned Parenthood, the Clark County School
District prohibited a particular advertisement. After indiscriminately accepting advertisements from churches, political candiall of
dates, casinos, bars and the United States
which are somewhat controversial or engender differences of
opinion in varying degrees, the school district disallowed the
Planned Parenthood ad because of a desire to remain "viewpoint neutral" and to avoid c o n t r o v e r ~ y .If~ ~this were truly
the rationale for the school district's decision, then advertisements from churches and political candidates would not have
been accepted either. In reality, it appears that the school district simply disapproved of Planned Parenthood's material and
therefore censored the ad. According to the Supreme Court,
this is unacceptable: "If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of a n idea simply because society finds the
idea itself offensive or di~agreeable."~~

71. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510
(1969). The Court adds that "students in some of the schools wore buttons relating
to national political campaigns, and some even wore the Iron Cross, traditionally a
symbol of Nazism. The order prohibiting the wearing of armbands did not extend
to these." Id.
72. Id.
73. See supra text accompanying note 16.
74. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
75. See supra note 49.
76. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d a t 829.
77. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); see also Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) ("The government violates
the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the
point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject."); id. a t 812 ("[Tlhe
purported concern to avoid controversy excited by particular groups may conceal a
bias against the viewpoint advanced by the excluded speakers."); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The 'mere desire
to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany a n unpopular
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The Ninth Circuit properly found that the school district's
rejection of the ad was reasonable, even though its analysis is
not particularly convincing. But a more fundamental problem
with the opinion is the majority's exclusive focus on policywhat it calls intentT8-and its disregard of practice. Under the
majority's test, as long as school officials have the expressed
policy to "reserve for themselves broad discretion to control
content, then they will be deemed to have 'intended' to create a
nonpublic forum, and their content-based exclusions will escape
strict s~rutiny."'~Allowing such broad discretion with minimal
judicial review "is heresy in First Amendment jurispmden~e."~'
Emphasizing an organization's policy, so as to ignore its
actual practice, departs from the methodology of past Supreme
Court decisions. In Widmar v. Vincent:' members of an evangelical religious group brought a n action to force the University
of Missouri at Kansas City to allow them to use its facilities?'
The University had previously allowed many groups, including
the evangelical religious group,s3 to use its facilities; this practice was changed by a regulation prohibiting the use of University buildings "for purposes of religious worship or religious
teaching."84 As a result of the exclusion, eleven members of
the group brought suit, claiming that the University had infringed on their freedoms of speech and religion, and their
right to equal p r ~ t e c t i o n . ~ ~
viewpoint,' or an unsavory subject, does not justify official suppression [of the
speech]." (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
78. Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 823.
79. Id, at 836 (Norris, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. 454 U.S.263 (1981).
82. The group, called Cornerstone, included Christian students from various
denominations. Their meetings included "prayer, hymns, Bible commentary, and
discussion of religious views and experiences." Id. a t 265 n.2.
83. In fad, the group had been allowed to meet on the University's campus
and to use the facilities from 1973 to 1977. Id.
84. Id. a t 264. The regulation reads, in part, as follows:
No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as herein provided)
may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching by
either student or nonstudent groups. . . . The general prohibition against
use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship or religious
teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of The Board of Curators, by
the Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any other construction.
Id. a t 265 n.3.
85. Id. at 266.
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The Court concluded that the University's actions had "created a forum generally open for use by student groups."86As a
result, discriminations and exclusions pertaining t o that forum
were reviewed under strict scrutiny rather than the reasonableness standard.87 Responding to the University's argument
that its institutional policy was to provide a secular educationS8without promoting religion, the Court stated that such a
policy "does not exempt its actions from constitutional scrutin ~ . " ~Therefore,
'
the Court reasoned that it must "look[] beyond the University's written policies" and focus on its practices to determine whether a public forum had been created."
Because the University's practices, notwithstanding its policy,
had created a public forum, any exclusion from that forum had
t o pass strict scrutiny.
A similar rationale was followed in Southeastern Promotions v. Conr~d.~'
Southeastern Promotions applied to the directors of Chattanooga Memorial Auditorium, a municipal theater, for permission t o show the production Hair. The theater
directors decided that, the production would "not be in the best
interest of the community" and rejected the appli~ation.'~
Southeastern sought a permanent injunction permitting it t o
use the auditorium, claiming the rejection had abridged its
First Amendment right t o free speech.93The district court deThe court of appeals
nied the injunctive reliefeg4
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the director's
rejection of Southeastern's application was an unconstitutional
act of cens~rship.~'
The Court based its decision primarily on
86. Id. at 267.
87. The Court used the strict scrutiny standard as established in Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). See supra text accompanying note 23. The Court stated that the University must "show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end." Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270.
88. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 268.
89. Id. at 270.
90. See Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d a t 837 morris, J., dissenting).
91. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
92. Id. at 548. The rejection was based on the fact that the directors had
heard from outside reports that the production "involved nudity and obscenity on
stage." Id.
93. Id.
94. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 341 F. Supp. 465 (ED.T ~ M .1972).
The court held that because of the degree of obscenity in the play, it was not entitled to First Amendment protection.
95. Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 486 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1973).
96. The primary doctrine used by the Court was the doctrine of prior re-
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the fact that the directors had the authority to exercise broad
and unfettered discretion: "Invariably, the Court has felt
obliged to condemn systems in which the exercise of such authority was not bounded by precise and clear standards.'"'
This condemnation is based on the reasoning "that the danger
of censorship. . . is too great where officials have unbridled
discretion over a forum's use."98
Significantly the Court did not place emphasis on the
theater's policy that the directors were to review play applications and reject those they felt were inappropriate. Because the
theater had the practice of indiscriminately opening its doors to
all productions, the city had created a limited public forum,
and the exclusion of Hair had to pass strict scrutiny.ggIn both
Widmar and Southeastern Promotions, the Court looked beyond
the written policies of the defendants and focused primarily on
their actual practices to determine whether an open or limited
public forum had been created. This type of analysis directly
contradicts the majority's reasoning in Planned Parenthood.
The Supreme Court has retreated from the Tinker standard which "swept broadly in its protection of students' First
Amendment rights while its description of exceptional situations justifying interference was narrow."100Hazelwood's dictum is evidence of this retreat because it gives school districts

straint. For discussion of this doctrine, see Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,
394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958);
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951).
97. Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 553.
98. Id. Furthermore, the Court's "distaste for censorship-reflecting the natural distaste of a free people-is deep-written in our law." Id. This principle played
a significant role in a case similar to Planned Parenthood. In Riseman v. School
Comm., 439 F.2d 148, 148 n.1 (1st Cir. 1971), the court prohibited a policy which
banned "advertising or promoting the interests of any community or non-school
agency or organization without the approval of the School Committee." Central to
the court's decision was that the review policy was vague and overly broad. Such
discretion does not ensure that the adverse effects of prior restraint will be minimized.' Id. at 149. For other decisions prohibiting similar policies dealing with
non-school sponsored publications in high schools because they were overly broad
and inadequately focused, see Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988);
Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973); Shanley v. Northeast
Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972).
Indeed, one court acknowledged that "[iln the years immediately following Tinker, the only circuit to approve a regulation allowing broad review and censorship
of nonschool-sponsored publications was the Second Circuit in Eisner v. Stamford
Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2nd Cir. 1971)." Burch, 861 F.2d a t 1156.
99. See Planned Parenthood, 941 F.2d at 836-37 (Norris, J., dissenting).
100. Burch, 861 F.2d a t 1153.
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much more discretion in censoring free speech within the
school environment and adopts a "broad definition of
curriculum."101One district court has stated that "because
Hazelwood opens the door to significant curtailment of cherished First Amendment rights, this Court declines to read the
decision with the breadth its dictum invites."lo2This particular court rationalized its rejection of the Hazelwood dictum by
reasoning that because educators have significant power to
limit expression, "courts must avoid enlarging the venues within which that rationale may legitimately obtain without a clear
and precise directive."lo3Planned Parenthood should have followed a similar interpretation of Hazelwood.
In spite of Planned Parenthood, free speech is not entirely
dead in the public schools. The Supreme Court still maintains
that a "limited open forum should be triggered by what a
school does, not by what it says."lo4A school district should
not be able t o "simply declare that it maintains a closed forum"
because of "some broadly defined educational goal" and then
"arbitrarily deny access to school facilities to any unfavored
[organization] on the basis of its speech content."105

101. Id. at 1158 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271
(1988)). Hazelwood gives educators "authority over school-sponsored publications,
theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school." Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
102. Romano v. Harrington, 725 F. Supp. 687, 689 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
103. Id. Romano pointed to an earlier Supreme Court decision as support for
limiting the interpretation of Hazelwood. In Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853 (1982), a plurality of the Court would have prohibited a policy of withdrawing
from school libraries books that were considered anti-American, anti-Semitic, or obscene. Against the claims that the policy served the interests of the community
and hrthered the desire to transmit community values, the plurality considered
the violation of constitutional rights more significant. Romano proposed that "Pico
counsels against broadening Hazelwood's reach. Pico explains that inroads on the
First Amendment in the name of education are less warranted outside the confines
of the classroom and its assignments." Romano, 725 F. Supp. at 690.
This reasoning is especially pertinent to Planned Parenthood. The advertisements at issue were not solicited in c o ~ e c t i o nwith the classroom; no evidence
existed that the advertisements had a purpose other than "to enable the school to
raise revenue to finance" the publications. Phnned Parenthood, 941 F.2d a t 824.
Therefore, the reach of Hazelwood, according to Romano (and possibly Pico), should
be limited.
104. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 244 (1990) (quoting 130 CONG.
REC. 19,222 (1984) (statement of Sen. Leahy)).
105. Id. at 244-45 (quoting Mergens v. Board of Educ., 867 F.2d 1076, 1078
(8th Cir. 1989)).
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V. CONCLUSION
Allowing the Clark County School District t o indiscriminately accept advertisements from any entity, with the exception of Planned Parenthood, essentially permits the school
district to unconstitutionally censor materials from the limited
public forum it has created in its advertising space. Looking to
the actual practices of the district, as required by the forum
analysis, it is clear that a limited public forum was established
in the advertising spaces of the publications involved. Simply
focusing on the intent of the school district, while turning a
blind eye t o its actions, circumvents an essential element of the
test. If a government organization only needs t o declare an
intent or policy that it reserves the power to censor any or all
expression in an open forum (traditional or designated) in order
t o prompt courts t o review restrictions under a reasonableness
standard rather than under strict scrutiny, freedom of expression is hardly the constitutional right it used to be. Further,
combining a reasonableness standard of review with a practice
by the courts of summarily dismissing the actual actions and
practices of the organization, looking solely t o the
organization's policy or intent, gives the state additional power
to curtail freedom of expression rights. Such "having-your-cakeand-eating-it-too"analysis can hardly stand as strong constitutional precedent.
Because the schools had created a limited public forum,
Planned Parenthood's ad should have been accepted along with
the ads from churches and political candidates. The Planned
Parenthood ad was no more controversial than the ads that
were accepted; indeed, many may argue that it is socially useful. The fact that some people may disagree with Planned
Parenthood's materials is an insufficient basis for allowing the
school district to censor the ad. Hazelwood gives school officials
plenty of discretion to control expression in the school environment; the Ninth Circuit should not have expanded this control.
The right t o freedom of expression is too vital to permit its
suppression, even in the public school environment.
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